

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6119
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 NICOSIA 1826

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2
TAGS: PGOV, CY, TU, US
SUBJECT: CONVERSATIONS WITH MAKARIOS AND DENKTASH

REF: (A) STATE 161385 (NOTAL), (B) STATE 162417 (NOTAL)

SUMMARY: WHILE STRESSING THAT HE WILL KEEP OPEN ALL OPTIONS, INCLUDING A CALL FOR INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, MAKARIOS REITERATES HIS BELIEF THAT ONLY ACTIVE US INVOLVEMENT CAN SOLVE THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND THAT HE VERY MUCH COUNTS ON SUCH INVOLVEMENT AND ON CLIFFORD. AGREES US AID CONTRIBUTION DESERVES GREATER PUBLIC RECOGNITION BY GOC. ACKNOWLEDGES DETRIMENTAL US REACTION SHOULD SENTENCES IN DAVIES CASE BE REDUCED ON APPEAL. DENKTASH CONTINUES TO BE TOTALLY UNREASONABLE BUT SEEMS TO ACCEPT FACT THAT CLIFFORD WILL BE BACK IN DUE COURSE WHATEVER HIS OBJECTIONS. END SUMMARY.

1. I HAD SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH MAKARIOS AND DENKTASH JULY 13 IN EACH CASE CAST AS A REVIEW OF THE CYPRUS SITUATION BEFORE GOING ON LEAVE. IN KEEPING WITH CYPRIOT CUSTOM, BOTH WILL THEMSELVES BE WORKING AT SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED PACES DURING
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LATE JULY AND AUGUST. AS EXAMPLE, MAKARIOS TOOK OFF FOR FIVE DAYS IN THE MOUNTAINS RIGHT AFTER OUR MEETING.

2. AT THE OUTSET OF CONVERSATION WITH MAKARIOS, I HANDED TO HIM TEXT OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S REPLY TO HIS JULY 4 CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE (REF A).

3. REMARKING ON MY RECENT FORTNIGHT'S CONSULTATION IN DEPT, MAKARIOS EXPRESSED APPRECIATION OF MR. CLIFFORD'S TELEPHONE CALL TO HIM IN LONDON, ASKED ABOUT CLIFFORD AND HIS PLANS. REFERRING TO AND DRAWING ON CLIFFORD'S TALK WITH KYPRIANOU, I SAID CLIFFORD'S MANDATE FROM PRESIDENT CARTER TO BE HELPFUL ON THE CYPRUS PROBLEM CONTINUED. BOTH HE AND SECRETARY VANCE WERE FOLLOWING GREEK-TURKISH-CYPRUS EVENTS CLOSELY. IT WAS TO BE EXPECTED THAT CLIFFORD WOULD RETURN TO THE AREA BUT PROBABLY NOT UNTIL THE GOVERNMENTAL SITUATION IN TURKEY HAD CLARIFIED. AS KYPRIANOU HAD UNDOUBTEDLY REPORTED, CLIFFORD HAD SAID THAT IF THE PARTIES DESIRED AND HE AGAIN VISITED THE AREA, HE WOULD BE WILLING TO ENGAGE HIMSELF IN ISSUES OF SUBSTANCE AND REMAIN FOR AS LONG AS HIS PRESENCE SEEMED USEFUL. IN SUM, MY WASHINGTON VISIT HAD BROUGHT HOME TO ME ONCE AGAIN THE PRIORITY AND COMMITMENT GIVEN THE CYPRUS PROBLEM BY PRESIDENT CARTER AND HIS SENIOR ADVISORS. MAKARIOS SIGNIFIED HIS AWARENESS AND APPRECIATION OF THIS.

4. I SAID IT APPEARED TO ME THAT THE ARCHBISHOP WAS CURRENTLY DEALING WITH FOUR TRACKS OF APPROACH TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. THE FIRST WAS THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS UNDER DE CUELLAR. WE WERE AWARE THAT DE CUELLAR INTENDED TO BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH THE PARTIES TO ARRANGE ONE OR TWO MEETINGS IN JULY/AUGUST. FROM MY DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON I BELIEVED THERE WAS A CONSENSUS ON OUR SIDE THAT THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS SHOULD NOT BE STRAINED TO THE POINT OF RUPTURE. IT WAS IMPORTANT, WE
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FELT, TO MAINTAIN THE UN UMBRELLA. AN OUTRIGHT BREAK IN THE TALKS WOULD MEAN WASTEFUL EXPENDITURE OF DIPLOMATIC ENERGY TO GET THEM STARTED AGAIN AFTER A GOVERNMENT HAD COME INTO BEING IN TURKEY, WE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH IT, AND HAD DECIDED HOW BEST TO PROCEED.

5. THE SECOND TRACK, I NOTED WAS US INVOLVEMENT. THE THIRD, INCREASINGLY MENTIONED BY OUR GREEK CYPRIOT ASSOCIATES, WAS A NEW RECOURSE TO THE UNGA. THE FOURTH, APPARENTLY, WAS A GOC INITIATIVE IN CALLING FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE.

6. I SAID THAT LOOKING AT THESE FOUR TRACKS I WONDERED WHAT WEIGHT MAKARIOS INTENDED TO GIVE TO EACH AND WHAT HE WOULD LIKE FROM US, GIVEN HIS REQUEST TO PRESIDENT CARTER FOR US ASSISTANCE.

7. THE ARCHBISHOP QUITE CANDIDLY REPLIED THAT HE WANTED TO KEEP OPEN HIS OPTIONS ON ALL FOUR AVENUES OF APPROACH. HE EXPECTED NOTHING AT THIS STATE FROM THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. HE AGREED THEY SHOULD BE PRESERVED AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR LATER USE. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THEY COULD GO NOWHERE UNTIL THE TURKISH SIDE WAS PREPARED TO COME FORWARD WITH MEANINGFUL POSITIONS ON TERRITORY AND CONSTITUTION.

8. MAKARIOS CONTINUED THAT IT HAD ALWAYS BEEN HIS POSITION THAT ONLY THROUGH FULL AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT COULD THE CYPRUS PROBLEM BE SOLVED. HE FELT THERE WAS AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON THIS SCORE. THE ONLY DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN US MIGHT BE ON THE TACTICS OF DEALING WITH TURKEY. THE US SEEMED TO PREFER A GENTLE APPROACH. HE HIMSELF BELIEVED TURKEY WOULD RESPOND ONLY TO "EMBARGOES" AND STERN ADVICE THAT IT WAS DISPENSABLE AS FAR AS US SECURITY WAS CONCERNED. IN THIS REGARD, HE THOUGHT VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE HAD TAKEN EXACTLY THE RIGHT LINE IN HIS PARIS INTERVIEW SOME MONTHS AGO: AN INTERVIEW WHICH HAD BEEN DENIED BUT WHICH HE KNEW IN FACT HAD TAKEN PLACE. A FIRM STAND WOULD NOT JEOPARDIZE US INTERESTS. TURKEY WOULD BE THE LAST COUNTRY TO LEAVE NATO. IT MIGHT
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"FLIRT WITH RUSSIA BUT THERE WOULD NEVER BE A MARRIAGE."

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9. MAKARIOS SAID THAT AS FOR THE UNGA, GOC DID INTEND TO PRESS FOR A NEW RESOLUTION, PERHAPS INCLUDING A CALL FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST TURKEY. THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE PROPOSAL, ON WHICH HE CONFIRMED THAT GOC WOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE, COULD BE PRESSED IN CONJUNCTION WITH A NEW UNGA RESOLUTION OR INDEPEND-

ENTLY. GOC ACCEPTED FACT THAT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE COULD NOT TAKE PLACE IF TURKEY OBJECTED. FINALLY, GOC DECISION WITH RESPECT TO HOW TO PLAY UNGA AND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WOULD DEPEND ON DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN NOW AND THEN (BY IMPLICATION THE MANIFESTATION AND RESULTS OF US/CLIFFORD ROLE). MAKARIOS REPEATED HIS CONVICTION THAT ONLY THROUGH AN ACTIVE US ROLE COULD THE CYPRUS PROBLEM BE SOLVED.

10. I NOTED THAT CONGRESS HAD COMPLETED ITS ACTION ON A \$15 MIL-LION FY78 AID ALLOCATION FOR CYPRUS. I SAID I WANTED HIM TO UNDERSTAND NEITHER WE, NOR AID WASHINGTON, NOR THE ADMINISTRATION HAD FOUGHT THIS. THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION HAD BEEN TO STATE HONESTLY THE GREEK CYPRIOT ECONOMIC SUCCESS STORY SINCE 1974 AND TO POINT OUT THAT ON THE BASIS OF CONGRESSIONALLY-DRAWN CRITERIA GOC HAD TECHNICALLY PERFORMED ITSELF OUT OF ELIGIBILITY FOR FURTHER ASSISTANCE. AT THE SAME TIME, WHEN ASKED, I HAD BEEN ABLE
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TO STATE TO INTERESTED LEGISLATORS WITH CONVICTION THAT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, IF APPROPRIATED, COULD CONTINUE TO BE EFFICIENTLY AND EFFECTIVELY UTILIZED. THE 1.6 PERCENT OVERHEAD OF THE US/UNHCR PROGRAM IN CYPRUS, I NOTED, WAS UNPARALLELED.

11. ON THE QUESTION OF AID FOR CYPRUS, I SAID, I HAD REPEATEDLY BEEN ASKED IN CONGRESS WHETHER US ASSISTANCE HAD BEEN GIVEN FAIR PUBLICITY BY THE GOC. I RECALLED OUR EARLIER CONVERSATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT AND SAID THAT DESPITE ARCHBISHOP'S ASSURANCE AND A GENERAL FEELING OF GOOD INTENTIONS ON THE PART OF THOSE CONCERNED, THERE HAD BEEN NO RESULTS FROM THE GOC SIDE. MAKARIOS REPLIED THAT CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN WAS UNDERSTANDABLE; HE WOULD REITERATE HIS INSTRUCTIONS TO PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICIALS.

12. AS A LAST MATTER I SAID THAT ON INSTRUCTIONS (REF B) I WISHED TO RAISE THE DAVIES CASE. WITHIN THE US ADMINISTRATION, IN CONGRESS, AND AMONG THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AT LARGE, THERE HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED SURPRISE AT THE DISPROPORTION BETWEEN THE MINIMAL SENTENCES GIVEN DAVIES' KILLERS AND THE GRAVITY OF THEIR CRIME. ANY REDUCTION IN THESE SENTENCES AS A RESULT OF THE APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT TO BE HEARD IN LATE OCTOBER WOULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH CYPRUS. THE ARCHBISHOP NODDED HIS UNDERSTANDING BUT MADE NO COMMENT.

13. MY CONVERSATION WITH MAKARIOS WAS GOOD-HUMORED AND QUITE FRIENDLY THROUGHOUT. ARCHBISHOP WAS TANNED AND IN GOOD, EVEN HIGH SPIRITS. THE ONLY PERCEPTIBLE EVIDENCE OF HIS HEART ATTACK WAS THAT HIS VOICE WAS CONSIDERABLY WEAKER THAN BEFORE.

14. LATER IN THE MORNING I SAW DENKTASH. I CAN ONLY CHARACTERIZE HIM AS HAVING BEEN PLEASANTLY BUT TOTALLY UNREASONABLE, BUT NOT DISAGREEABLE. ALL THE USUAL THEMES WERE THERE AND I

WILL NOT REPEAT THEM IN DETAIL: US INVOLVEMENT IN THE CYPRUS
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PROBLEM IS WRONG. WHILE CLIFFORD'S INTENTIONS WERE GOOD AND HE IS A MAN OF ADMIRABLE STATURE AND AUTHORITY, THE TIMING OF HIS FIRST MISSION WAS ALL WRONG. IT SERVED ONLY TO LET MAKARIOS JUMP OFF THE HOOK OF THE MAKARIOS/DENKTASH TALKS INTO WHICH HE HAD BEEN DRAWN AGAINST HIS WILL BUT WHICH FOR THE FIRST TIME OFFERED PROSPECT OF REAL PROGRESS. AS LONG AS MAKARIOS PRETENDS TO BE PRESIDENT OF ALL CYPRUS, GOES TO THE UN, SPEAKS OF LONG STRUGGLE, AND TRIES TO IMPOSE AN ECONOMIC BLOCKADE ON THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS, THERE IS NO POINT TO NEGOTIATION. UDI IS THE ONLY PRACTICAL COURSE FOR TURKISH CYPRIOTS. AMERICAN LEADERS AND POLICY ON CYPRUS ARE "HOSTAGE TO THE GREEK LOBBY."

15. REPLYING WHEN DENKTASH'S MONOLOGUE HAD RUN ITS COURSE, I SAID MR. CLIFFORD HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE MODERATE TONE OF DENKTASH'S LETTER TO HIM. DENKTASH WAS MISREADING US INTENTIONS, WHICH WERE DIRECTED TO ELIMINATION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AS AN OBSTACLE TO RESTORATION OF OUR IMPORTANT RELATIONSHIP WITH TURKEY. DENKTASH WAS WRONG IN ACCUSING US LEADERSHIP OF LACK OF OBJECTIVITY. NO SOLUTION ENVISAGED BY THE USG WOULD SEEK TO TURN THE CLOCK BACK IN A WAY THAT WOULD JEOPARDIZE TURKISH CYPRIOTS' NEW-FOUND SENSE OF SECURITY AND A REASONABLE MEASURE OF SELF-ADMINISTRATION. USG INTENDED TO REMAIN INVOLVED. I THOUGHT IT LIKELY THAT DENKTASH WOULD BE SEEING MR. CLIFFORD AGAIN IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE AS WE PERSISTED IN OUR EFFORTS TO BE HELPFUL.

16. IN SAYING GOODBYE, DENKTASH SEEMED TO ACCEPT THIS AS A CERTAINLY WITH SOMEWHAT MORE EQUANIMITY THAN HIS REMARKS HAD INDICATED. CRAWFORD

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